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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN CALIFORNIA:
COURT ACTION POWERS OF STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS
James P. Wagoner*
I. INTRODUCTION
The fog closed over Donora [Pennsylvania] on the
morning of Tuesday, October 26th [1948]. The weather
was raw, cloudy, and dead calm, and it stayed that way
as the fog piled up all that day and the next. By Thurs-
day, it had stiffened adhesively into a motionless clot of
smoke. That afternoon, it was just possible to see across
the street, and, except for the stacks, the mills had vanished.
The air began to have a sickening smell, almost a taste.
It was the bittersweet reek of sulfur dioxide. Everyone who
was out that day remarked on it, but no one was much con-
cerned. The smell of sulfur dioxide, a scratchy gas given
off by burning coal and melting ore, is a normal concomitant
of any durable fog in Donora. This time it merely seemed
more penetrating than usual.
As one of the physicians described it, "I knew that
whatever it was that we were up against was serious. I had
seen some very pitiful cases and they weren't all asthmatics
or chronics of any kind. Some were people who had never
been bothered by fog before. I was worried, but wasn't be-
wildered. It was no mystery-it was obvious-all the symp-
toms pointed to it-that the fog and smoke were to blame.
I didn't think any further than that. As a matter of fact,
I didn't have time to think or wonder. I was too damn
busy. My biggest problem was just getting around. It was
almost impossible to drive. I even had trouble finding the
office. McKean Avenue was solid coal smoke. I could taste
the soot when I got out of the car, and my chest felt tight.
On the way up the stairs, I started to cough and I couldn't
stop. I kept coughing and choking until my stomach turned
over-just made it to the office and into the laboratory in
time. My God, I was sick! After a while I dragged myself
into the office and gave myself an injection of adrenalin and
* B.A., St. Mary's College, 1970; J.D., University of Santa Clara School
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lay back in a chair. I began to feel better. I felt so much
better I got out a cigar and lighted up. That practically
finished me. I probably should have known better-cigars
had tasted terrible all day-but I hadn't had that reaction
before. Then I heard the phone ringing. I guess it must
have been ringing off and on all day long. I thought about
answering it, but I didn't have the strength to move.'
From this single three day incident of fog mixed with pol-
luted air, twenty people died and nearly six thousand were made
ill in a city of approximately fourteen thousand persons.2 Similar
environmental catastrophes have occurred in New Orleans, Lou-
isiana; Weirton, West Virginia; London, England; Yokohama,
Japan; Poza Rica, Mexico and Belgium.'
Although severe incidents such as these occur infrequently,
few arguments can be raised against the premise that the daily
pollution of the environment is a critical problem. One need only
glance at our brown sky, murky rivers, and disappearing wildlife
to determine that mankind is nearing the point of giving Mother
Nature an abortion.
In response to this pollution problem, the California legisla-
ture has enacted new laws designed to curb the rapid degradation
of the environment.4 Most of these laws have established new
administrative agencies or have empowered existing agencies
with the authority to take particular action to solve specific prob-
lems.' Few agencies, if any, are clothed with the authority to es-
tablish overall environmental goals and take the steps necessary
to achieve them.'
1. KRimR, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 2-3 (1971), citing Prindle,
The Disaster Potential of Community Air Pollution, in THE AIR WE BREATHE
(Farber & Wilson, eds. 1961).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Mulford-Carrell Air Resources Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 39000 et seq. (West Supp. 1973); Porter-Cologne Water Quality Con-
trol Act, CAL. WATER CODE § 13000 et seq. (West 1971); see also Diamond
v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 374, 97 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1971).
5. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5200 et seq. (West Supp. 1973)
(the Department of Public Works has jurisdiction over outdoor advertising near
freeways); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 900-03 (West Supp. 1973) (the De-
partment of Fish and Game has jurisdiction over endangered species); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 39010-13 (West Supp. 1973) (the Department of
Public Health has power to control motor vehicle emissions); CAL. PuB. RES.
CODE §§ 21100-07 (West Supp. 1973) (the Office of Planning and Research
prepares environmental impact reports); CAL. S'TS. & H'WAYS CODE §§ 70, 227-
28 (West Supp. 1973) (the Highway Commission and the Scenic Highway Ad-
visory Committee has power over all other highways); Lynch and Stevens, Envi-
ronmental Law-The Uncertain Trumpet, 5 U.S.F. L. REV. 10 (1970-71);
Comment, Regional Control of Air and Water Pollution in the San Francisco
Bay Area, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 702 (1967).
6. See note 5 supra. Note, however, that the legislature recently enacted
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In addition to action by the legislature, response has been
generated by concerned citizen groups such as the Sierra Club
and numerous local organizations. However, when such groups
take pollution problems to court they often find their hands tied
by issues such as standing to sue7 and the difficulty of meeting
class action requirements,8 as well as by the burdensome costs of
litigation.
There is need in California for integrated governmental en-
tities with ample authority, manpower, and finances to assume
overall leadership to deal with environmental problems compre-
hensively. As will be demonstrated in the following discussion,
the Attorney General and the various district attorneys, county
counsels, and city attorneys are currently the only persons who
have the broad powers and sufficient resources to achieve overall
environmental objectives. With respect to these objectives, even
if the activities of other government agencies and citizens' groups
eventually become adequately and efficiently organized, the pow-
ers of government attorneys nevertheless are useful as additional,
independent weapons against environmental destruction.
II. STATUTORY POWERS
A. Powers of the Attorney General
1. General Powers
As chief law officer of the state, the California Attorney
General derives broad environmental protection powers from two
primary sources. Article V, section 13 of the California Con-
stitution provides:
Subject to the powers and duties of the Governor, the
Attorney General shall be the chief law officer of the state.
It shall be his duty to see that the laws of the state are uni-
formly and adequately enforced. He shall have direct su-
pervision over every District Attorney and Sheriff and over
Government Code sections 16000-81 establishing the Environmental Quality
Study Council. The council is designed to establish overall environmental goals
with the assistance of state agencies. The ultimate effectiveness of the council
has not yet been established; its members are all high-ranking political appoint-
ees. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16050 (West Supp. 1973).
7. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1971); Wetherton v. Growers
Farm Labor Ass'n, 275 Cal. App. 2d 168, 79 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1969); Laczko
v. Jules Meyer, Inc., 276 Cal. App. 2d 293, 80 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1968); Bohn
v. Smith, 252 Cal. App. 2d 678, 60 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1963). See also Private
Lawsuits and Air Pollution, 56 A.B.A.J. 465 (1970).
8. Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 374, 97 Cal. Rptr. 639
(1971). See La Sala v. American Savings and Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489
P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971); Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 2d 864, 442
P.2d 692, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1968).
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such other law enforcement officers as may be designated
by law, in all matters pertaining to the duties of their re-
spective offices, and may require any of said officers to
make to him such reports concerning investigation, detection,
prosecution and punishment of crime in their respective juris-
dictions as to him may seem advisable. Whenever in the
opinion of the Attorney General any law of this state is not
being adequately enforced in any county, it shall be the duty
of the Attorney General to prosecute any violations of the
law of which the superior court shall have jurisdiction, and
in such cases he shall have all the powers of a district at-
torney. When required by the public interest or directed by
the Governor, he shall assist any district attorney in the dis-
charge of his duties.9
Pursuant to this provision, the Attorney General and his au-
thorized agents' 0 possess statutorily enacted environmental protec-
tion powers in several different capacities: (1) the Attorney
General is the legal representative of state agencies; (2) he has
the power of attorney in the legal matters of the state; and (3) he
directs and assists in legal actions brought by the counties.
As exclusive representative of most state agencies,"1 the
Attorney General represents those agencies which exercise
some environmental functions. For example, the state depart-
ments of Public Resources, Fish and Game, and Health, the Wa-
ter Resources Control Board, the Air Resources Board, and the
State Lands Commission are all represented by the Attorney
General.' 2 A few exceptions to this general rule of exclusive
representation by the Attorney General exist by statute'8 and
other exceptions may be made when the Attorney General con-
sents to the employment of outside counsel, 14 the governor ap-
points outside counsel,1" or the Attorney General requests a local
9. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13.
10. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11043 (West 1968); see People v. City of Los An-
geles, 160 Cal. App. 2d 494, 325 P.2d 639 (1958).
11. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11042 (West 1968) states that "[n]o state agency
shall employ any legal counsel other than the Attorney General, or one of his
assistants or deputies, in any matter in which the agency is interested."
12. See generally People v. New Penn Mines, 212 Cal. App. 2d 667, 28
Cal. Rptr. 337 (1963); Lynch and Stevens, Environmental Law-The Uncertain
Trumpet, 5 U.S.F. L. REV. 10, 13 (1970-71).
13. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11041, 12511 (West 1968). See also CAL. CORP.
CODE § 25307 (West 1970); CAL. HARB. & NAY. CODE § 76.6 (West 1970);
CAL. REV. & TAx CODE § 23035 (West 1970). Note that even though the Pub-
lic Utilities Commission can employ outside counsel, Public Utility Code section
307 requires the Attorney General to act on behalf of the Commission if re-
quested. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 307 (West 1956).
14. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11040 (West 1968).
15. Id. § 12013. See also CAL. GOV'T CODE H9 12520, 12533 (West 1963)
authorizing the employment of special counsel in such situations.
1974]
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district attorney to represent a state agency.16
The Government Code not only stipulates that the Attorney
General act as the legal representative of state agencies, but also
that he be in charge of the Department of Justice and have the
power of attorney in virtually all legal matters in which the state
has an interest.17 Consequently, irrespective of his other vested
powers, the Attorney General possesses certain environmental
powers directly through his involvement in suits relating to
state lands or the state's rights therein.' 8  Accordingly, in People
v. Holladay,'9 the Attorney General brought an action for the re-
moval of certain buildings from land owned by the state and desig-
nated as a park; and in California & Northern Ry. v. State21
the Attorney General represented the state in condemnation pro-
ceedings brought against state lands.21 Within these general
powers, the Attorney General could conceivably represent the state
in its proprietary capacity in various types of actions. 2
The Attorney General also possesses certain environmental
protection powers through his participation in actions to which a
county is a party. By statutory provision, the Attorney General
is authorized to "assist" local district attorneys in the discharge of
their duties.2 3  Although this provision mentions only the dis-
16. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11157 (West 1970). See Evans v. Superior Court,
14 Cal. 2d 563, 96 P.2d 107 (1939), appeal dismissed, 309 U.S. 640 (1939). For
authority under which the Attorney General might take action on behalf of, or
against state agencies, see CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 14101-04 (West 1970); CAL.
FISH & GAME CODE § 901 et seq. (West 1970); CAL. GOV'T CODE §H 14785-
85.5 (West 1968); CAL. HARB. & NAv. CODE § 151 (West 1970); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 205-06 (West 1970); CAL. PUB. REC. CODE §
21000 et seq. (West 1970); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 10106 (West 1970); CAL.
S'TS & H'wAys CODE § 570-75.7 (West 1970); CAL. WATER CODE § 175.5 (West
1970).
17. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12510-11 (West 1970).
18. City of Hermosa Beach v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. App. 2d 295, 41
Cal. Rptr. 796 (1965); California & Northern Ry. Co. v. State, 1 Cal. App.
142, 81 P. 971 (1905); People v. Holladay, 68 Cal. 439, 9 P. 655 (1886); People
ex rel. Van Valer v. Jacob, 2 C.U. 672, 12 P. 383 (1886); People ex rel. Rondel
v. North S.F. Homestead & R.R. Ass'n, 38 Cal. 564 (1969).
19. 68 Cal. 439, 9 P. 655 (1886).
20. 1 Cal. App. 142, 81 P. 971 (1905).
21. See note 18 supra.
22. As in the case of state agencies, the Attorney General may be removed
as counsel in these situations under certain conditions: employment of outside
counsel, appointment by the Governor of outside counsel, or involvement of a
state agency authorized to employ outside counsel. See notes 13-16 and accom-
panying text supra.
23. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12550 (West 1970) states:
When he deems it advisable or necessary in the public interest, or
when directed to do so by the Governor, he shall assist any district at-
torney in the discharge of his duties, and may, where he deems it nec-
essary, take full charge of any investigation or prosecution of violation
of law of which the superior court has jurisdiction. In this respect he
has all the powers of a district attorney, including the power to issue
[Vol. 14
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trict attorney, it may include assistance to a county counsel as
well.24 It is thus possible for the Attorney General to assist in
numerous suits litigated primarily by county attorneys. These
suits could include environmental protection actions on behalf of
local Air Pollution Control Districts, 5 Water Districts,26 Soil
Conservation Districts,27 Departments of Public Works,28 and
other local agencies.29
This empowering provision as well as the constitutional
authority of the Attorney General also authorizes him to take
charge of prosecutions for violations of law.80 Although this sec-
tion was probably enacted with criminal prosecutions in mind,8' it
has been held that the Attorney General has the power to super-
vise civil actions brought by a county.12  Accordingly, viola-
tions of law normally prosecuted by a county may be prose-
cuted by the Attorney General. These include such violations as
maintaining local public nuisances, failing to comply with emis-
sion requirements, and violating water pollution standards. 3
2. Specific Powers
Certain specific environmental powers augment the general
powers of the Attorney General. In 1971, the legislature en-
acted a broad authorization of authority for the Attorney Gen-
eral to protect the natural resources of the state from pollution,
impairment or destruction.3 4  This action was, in part, an attempt
to broaden the scope of the Attorney General's environmental
authority but also an attempt to nullify the implications of an
appellate decision in People v. New Penn Mines. 5 In that case
or cause to be issued subpoenas or other process.
24. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 26529, 27642, 27645 (West 1968) providing
that the appointed county counsel discharge the civil duties of the district at-
torney.
25. See Orange County Air Pollution Control Dist. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n,
4 Cal. 3d 945, 484 P.2d 1361, 95 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1971).
26. CAL. WATER CODE § 30000 et seq. (West 1970).
27. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 9266 (West 1970).
28. CAL. GOV'T CODE H§ 26529, 27642, 27645 (West 1968).
29. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27645 (West 1968).
30. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13; CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12550 (West 1968).
31. See People v. Brophy, 49 Cal. App. 2d 15, 120 P.2d 946 (1942); People
v. Phillips, 45 Cal. 44 (1872); CAL. PEN. CODE § 923 (West 1970). See also
the dissenting opinion of Justice Fourt in Don Wilson Builders v. Superior Court,
220 Cal. App. 2d 77, 33 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1963).
32. County of Sacramento v. Central Pacific Ry. Co., 61 Cal. 250, 10
P.C.L.C. 311 (1882).
33. See text, Section II, B infra. The Attorney General also has a condi-
tional right of appeal to the California Supreme Court in suits involving a
county. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12512 (West 1970).
34. CAL. GOV'T CODE H§ 12600-12 (West Supp. 1973).
35. 212 Cal. App. 2d 667, 28 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1963). For a fuller discus-
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the Attorney General brought a nuisance action seeking abate-
ment of toxic mine wastes which were being discharged into the
Mokelumne River. The court analyzed the scope of the Dickey
Water Pollution Act and held that the breadth of the act pre-
empted the authority of the Attorney General to bring the action
in question.
To remedy the effect of this decision, the legislature enacted
Government Code sections 12000-612 which grant broad en-
vironmental protection authority to the Attorney General. 0
Government Code section 12606 provides:
The Attorney General shall be permitted to intervene in
any judicial or administrative proceeding in which facts are
alleged concerning pollution or adverse environmental effects
which could affect the public generally. 87
This section permits the Attorney General to represent the interests
of the people in any proceeding in which the outcome could affect
the environment. 8  Furthermore, Government Code - section
12607 provides:
The Attorney General may maintain an action for equi-
table relief in the name of the people of the state of Cali-
fornia against any person for the protection of the natural
resources of the state from pollution, impairment or destruc-
tion.89
The term "natural resources" is broadly defined in Government
Code section 12605 to include "land, water, air, minerals, vegeta-
tion, wildlife, silence, historic or aesthetic sites, or any other natu-
ral resource which, irrespective of ownership contributes, or in
the future may contribute, to the health, safety, welfare, and en-
joyment of a substantial number of persons, or to the substantial
sion of the New Penn Mines case see note 141 and accompanying text infra.
See also Lynch and Stevens, Environmental Law-The Uncertain Trumpet, 5
U.S.F. L. REV. 10, 23-4 (1970-71).
36. See Krueger, Coastal Zone Management: The California Experience, CAL.
S.B.J. 403, 445 (1972).
37. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12606 (West Supp. 1973).
38. CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 389.6 (West 1973) provides that:
In any action brought by any party for relief of any nature other than
solely for money damages where a pleading alleges facts or issues con-
cerning alleged pollution or adverse environmental effects which could
affect the public generally, the party filing the pleading shall furnish a
copy to the Attorney General of the State of California. Such copy
shall be furnished by the party filing the pleading within 10 days after
filing.
Even without this express power, it would appear that the Attorney General has
the capacity to intervene to protect the interests of the people of the state. See
In re McCabe's Estate, 219 Cal. 742, 29 P.2d 195 (1924); Mathews v. Savings
Union Bank & Trust Co., 43 Cal. App. 45, 184 P.2d 418 (1939); In re Peterson's
Estate, 138 Cal. App. 443, 32 P.2d 423 (1934).
39. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 12607 (West Supp. 1973).
[Vol. 14
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balance of an ecological community. '40 Under the breadth of
this definition, the Attorney General can file an independent ac-
tion, or intervene in an existing action, for the purpose of protect-
ing any aspect of the environment."
Even prior to 1971, the Attorney General possessed statutory
power to protect the environment by abating public nuisances.
Civil Code section 3480 defines a public nuisance as "one which
affects, at the same time, an entire community or neighborhood,
or any considerable number of persons;"4 Civil Code section
3494 permits any public body or authorized officer to abate such
a nuisance." It has been held that the Attorney General posses-
ses this abatement power on behalf of the people." Numerous
activities damaging to the environment may be abated as public
nuisances, including the operation of quarries,45 blasting,4 6 unlaw-
ful diversion of water,47 pollution of streams and rivers," and
air and noise pollution. Moreover, numerous code provisions
declare particular activities or objects to be public nuisances
and thus subject to abatement. These include unauthorized opera-
tion of placer mines, 50 oil and gas wells in certain areas,5 ' unau-
40. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12605 (West Supp. 1973).
41. Other Government Code sections relating to the Attorney General's in-
dependent statutory power include: § 12600 (legislative findings and declaration),
§ 12601 (caveat expressly disclaiming pre-emption of other statutory or common-
law powers), § 12602 (severability section), § 12603 (providing for liberal con-
struction), § 12604 (defining "person" for purposes of authorizing the Attorney
General to institute action against any person, organization or agency), § 12608
(providing for certain affirmative defenses by the defendant), § 12609 (statute
of limitations), § 12610 (providing for the imposition of conditions on the de-
fendant when equitable relief is granted), § 12611 (providing for stay of court
proceedings), § 12612 (providing prerequisites for intervention or judicial review
of administrative decisions).
42. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3480 (West 1970).
43. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3494 (West 1970).
44. California & Oregon Power Co. v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. 2d 858, 291
P.2d 455 (1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 823 (1956); People v. Truckee Lumber
Co., 116 Cal. 397, 48 P. 374 (1897); People ex rel. Roberts v. Beaudry, 91 Cal.
213, 27 P. 610 (1891); Coburn v. Ames, 52 Cal. 385 (1882); People v. Glenn-
Colusa Irrigation Dist., 127 Cal. App. 30, 15 P.2d 549 (1932). See also People
v. New Penn Mines, 212 Cal. App. 2d 667, 28 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1963).
45. Morton v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. App. 2d 321, 269 P.2d 81 (1954).
46. Alonso v. Hills, 95 Cal. App. 2d 778, 214 P.2d 50 (1950).
47. People v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 127 Cal. App. 30, 15 P.2d 549
(1932).
48. McCarthy v. Gaston Ridge Mill & Min. Co., 144 Cal. 542, 78 P. 7
(1904).
49. Judson v. Los Angeles Suburban Gas Co., 157 Cal. 108, 106 P. 581
(1910); Wilms v. Hand, 101 Cal. App. 2d 811, 226 P.2d 728 (1951); McIn-
tosh v. Brimmer, 68 Cal. App. 770, 230 P. 203 (1924); Melvin v. E.B. & A.L.
Stone Co., 7 Cal. App. 327, 94 P. 390 (1908).
50. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 2558-59 (West 1970).
51. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 3600 (West 1970). See also 4 HAST. L. J. 173
(1953); 24 So. C. L. REv. 332 (1951); 5 STAN. L. REv. 369 (1953).
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thorized billboards, 52 improperly maintained rubbish dumps, 58
and cesspools in particular areas. 54
Other specific powers given the Attorney General include
several extraordinary equity powers which may be used in certain
situations to protect the environment. These powers relate to water
and air quality. Under section 13262 of the California Water
Code, the Regional Water Quality Control Boards may request
the Attorney General to obtain an injunction to halt the dis-
charge of waste into public waters.55 Injunctive relief is statu-
torily facilitated when so sought. Section 13361(c) of the Water
Code eliminates the requirements of alleging or proving irreparable
injury or inadequacy of the remedy at law, which is normally re-
quired in an action for an injunction.56
The Attorney General has been given similar powers with
respect to air pollution under several pieces of air quality legis-
lation enacted over the years.5 7  This legislation authorizes the
Attorney General to enjoin the discharge of contaminants in viola-
tion of an order or rule of a local air pollution control district or
regional air resources board. 8 As with the water quality powers,
the important factor is that the Attorney General is not re-
quired to allege or prove inadequacy of remedy at law or po-
tential irreparable injury.59 By removing these requirements, the
Attorney General is permitted to file and succeed in many water
and air quality actions which would otherwise fail due to the
proof problems traditionally associated with equity actions.
Prior to 1971 the California Attorney General's office con-
fined its involvement in the environmental protection arena pri-
marily to representing state agencies.60 In 1971, Attorney Gen-
52. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5460-65 (West 1970). City of Escondido
v. Desert Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 8 Cal. 3d 785, 505 P.2d 1012, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 260 (1973).
53. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 4375 (West 1970); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §
4441 (West 1970). Other statutorily declared public nuisances include: insect
infested plants or premises, abandoned crops, citrus plants infested with particu-
lar types of flies, certain types of weeds, citrus plants in certain areas, animals
infested with dourine, all of which are provided for in the California Agriculture
Code.
54. CAL. WATER CODE § 13950 (West 1970).
55. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13223, 13262, 13264, 13304, 13340-50 (West
1970).
56. CAL. WATER CODE § 13361(c) (West 1970).
57. See generally Environmental Defense Fund v. California Air Resources
Bd., 30 Cal. App. 3d 829, 106 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1973); Diamond v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 374, 97 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1971); Orange County
Air Pollution Control Dist. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 4 Cal. 3d 945, 484 P.2d 1361,
95 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1971).
58. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24252, 39437 (West 1970).
59. Id.
60. Letter from Larry C. King, Deputy Attorney General, State of Califor-
nia, to author, November 8, 1972.
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eral Evelle Younger created a separate environmental law unit
comprised of ten attorneys to handle self-generated environmen-
tal actions. With the establishment of the new unit and the
enactment of legislation giving the Attorney General broad environ-
mental powers,6 1 the California Attorney General's office has the
potential for actively pursuing environmental protection actions in
a wide variety of areas such as air and water pollution, land use,
noise pollution, solid waste management, population, pesticides,
beach access, fish, game and endangered species, forest practices,
highways, oil, public ultilities, radiation, wildernesses and wild
rivers."
In order to enlist citizen input and assistance in developing
courses of action, the environmental unit has established num-
erous Environmental Task Forces throughout the state."' These
Task Forces are composed of twenty to twenty-five volunteer mem-
bers from five major categories:
(1) other public attorneys with environmental re-
sponsibilities such as the district attorneys, county counsels
and city attorneys;
(2) public administrative officials charged with en-
vironmental enforcement (including the Regional Adminis-
trator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency
and the chairman of the local Regional Water Quality Con-
trol Board);
(3) representatives of citizens' organizations with en-
vironmental interests (such as the county president of the
League of Women Voters and a representative of the Sierra
Club);
(4) independent experts in major environmental areas
(for example, air, water, noise, land use, solid waste); and,
(5) individuals representing business and student
groups.64
Each Task Force usually has subcommittees which deal with
problems in the areas of air, water, noise, land use and solid waste.
These subcommittees are composed of both task force members
and other interested citizens who may be appointed. Subcom-
mittee recommendations are directed to the full Task Force,
which may in turn make proposals for action to the Environmental
Law Unit.6"
61. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12600-12 (West Supp. 1973).
62. Letter from Ms. Jan C. Chatten, Deputy Attorney General, State of Cal-
ifornia, to author, November 2, 1972.
63. See Krueger, Coastal Zone Management: The California Experience, 47
Cal. S.B.J. 403, 445 (1972).
64. See notes 60 and 62 supra.
65. Letter from Larry C. King, Deputy Attorney General, State of Califor-
nia, to author, November 8, 1972.
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The new unit, assisted by the Task Forces, has enabled the
California Attorney General's office to become a major source of
environmental litigation. Suits have been filed against viola-
tors ranging from private polluters to governmental agencies. The
Attorney General's involvement in administrative actions ranges
from appearing before local government boards to formally
petitioning the United States Environmental Protection Agency
and the Department of the Interior. 6
B. Powers of County Attorneys
Each county in California has a district attorney as its
legal representative. 7 Many larger counties divide their legal
duties into two categories--criminal and civil.6 s In these counties
the district attorney handles criminal matters but the county
board of supervisors appoints a county counsel to handle civil
matters."9 When a county counsel is appointed he will prob-
ably possess most of the environmental power previously con-
ferred upon the district attorney. Statutes declaring the district
attorney to be the proper party to take particular action in the
environmental field can be interpreted as referring to the county
counsel as well when such a position exists. 70
66. The Annual Report of the Attorney General's Environmental Law Unit
discloses that from January, 1971, through May, 1973, 428 investigations were
conducted. These investigations resulted in the Attorney General's initiating or
participating in thirty court suits and thirty administrative actions. According
to several members of the Task Forces that the author has interviewed, a "high
percentage" of Task Force recommendations are ultimately approved for formal
action. Reported appellate cases in which the Attorney General has participated
include: City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973);
Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 514 P.2d 111,
109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973); Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal.
3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972); Associated Home Builders,
Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630
(1971); County of Orange v. Heim, 30 Cal. App. 3d 694, 106 Cal. Rptr. 825
(1973); and, Environmental Defense Fund v. Coastside County Water District,
27 Cal. App. 3d 695, 104 Cal. Rptr. 197, and 28 Cal. App. 3d 512, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 714 (1972) (subsequent opinion).
67. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 26500-43 (West 1968). See Maryland Cas.
Co. v. Kern County, 83 F.2d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 1936).
68. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 26529, 27642, 27645 (West 1968). See In re Mill-
er's Estate, 5 Cal. 2d 588, 55 P.2d 491 (1936); Jaynes v. Stockton, 193 Cal.
App. 2d 47, 14 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1961); Ogle v. Eckel, 49 Cal. App. 2d 599, 122
P.2d 67 (1942).
69. Id. Note, however, that California Government Code section 25203 de-
clares that the county board of supervisors should direct and control the prose-
cution and defense of all actions to which the county is a party. Under this
section, the board of supervisors can, by a two-thirds vote, authorize the employ-
ment of outside counsel in order to assist in the handling of litigation. See also,
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 31001 (West 1968).
70. See, e.g., CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 8 (West 1969); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§ 8 (West 1972). See also the discussion of Board of Supervisors v. Simpson,




The district attorney and county counsel possess certain lim-
ited environmental power as the representatives of numerous dis-
tricts, boards and regional state agencies.7' The primary duty of
the county's civil representative is to advise and bring action on
behalf of the county board of supervisors. 72  Furthermore, the
district attorney or county counsel represents numerous special
districts and regional boards such as Air Pollution Control Dis-
tricts, 73 Water Districts, 74 Soil Conservation Districts, 75 the Board
of Forestry,76 and the County Health Board.77
The county district attorney also has certain environmental
protection powers in his role as public prosecutor.78  In this ca-
pacity, the district attorney can bring criminal prosecutions for
violations of certain environmental protection laws that specify
criminal penalties. These violations include killing, trapping or
wounding birds or game in a refuge, 9 creating and maintaining
a public nuisance, 0 unlawfully accumulating waste on lands, 1 fail-
ing to remove unlawful billboards,' unlawfully discharging waste
into a lake or stream,8 3 and discharging air pollutants. 4  In addi-
tion, the district attorney has the authority to bring actions for
monetary penalties for certain unlawful acts which adversely af-
71. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27645 (West 1968). For codifications of general
county powers relating to environmental protection that county counsels or dis-
trict attorneys may enforce, see CAL. Gov'T CODE § 25803 (West 1968) (control
of animals at large); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 4260 (West 1970); CAL.
GOV'T CODE §9 25600-02 (West 1968) (wild flower reserves); CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 6950-54 (West 1968) (open spaces); CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 7000-01
(West 1968) (scenic conservation reserves); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 25550-62,
37111-12 (West 1968) (county parks); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54090 (West 1968)
(beach access). See also Orange County Air Pollution Control Dist. v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 4 Cal. 3d 945, 484 P.2d 1361, 95 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1971).
72. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27645 (West 1968).
73. Orange County Air Pollution Control Dist. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 4 Cal.
3d 945, 484 P.2d 1361, 95 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1971).
74. CAL. WATER CODE § 30000 et seq. (West 1970).
75. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 9277 (West 1970).
76. CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 25630-35 (West 1968).
77. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 450-51 (West 1970). At one time,
the district attorney also represented the Regional Water Quality Control Boards.
The case of People v. New Penn Mines, 212 Cal. App. 2d 667, 28 Cal. Rptr.
337 (1963), extremely limited that power however, and the legislature eventu-
ally turned all such representation over to the Attorney General. See CAL. WA-
TER CODE § 13331 (West 1970).
78. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 26500 (West 1968).
79. CAL. FISH AND GAME CODE 33 10508-10 (West 1958).
80. CAL. PEN. CODE § 369(h), 370 et seq. (West 1970).
81. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 4441 (West 1972).
82. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5464 (West Supp. 1973).
83. CAL. WATER CODE § 13265 (West 1971).
84. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24253 (West 1967).
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fect the environment.8 5 These acts include oil spillage into state
waters 6 and intentionally or negligently discharging air contami-
nants in violation of the Mulford-Carrell Air Resources Act. 7
District attorneys and county counsels also obtain some en-
vironmental protection power through their representation of state
agencies at the direction of the Attorney General. Government
Code section 11157 provides that any action that could be under-
taken by the Attorney General on behalf of a state agency can
also be maintained by any local county counsel or district attor-
ney at the Attorney General's request.88 This could include ac-
tions on behalf of state or regional water pollution control boards,
the Department of Public Resources, the State Forester and many
other agencies.89
2. Specific Powers
The primary independent power which allows the county
counsel or the district attorney to take environmental protection
action is the power to abate public nuisances. A nuisance is de-
fined as:
Anything which is injurious to health, or is indecent or
offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of
property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment
of life or property. .... 90
Under this abatement power, the authorized county attorney is
allowed to bring actions in numerous areas.9 ' Specific code sec-
85. Board of Supervisors v. Simpson, 36 Cal. 2d 671, 674, 227 P.2d 14, 16
(1951), citing CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 26500-02, 26521 (West 1951).
86. CAL. HARB. & NAY. CODE § 151 (West Supp. 1973).
87. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39261 (West Supp. 1973).
88. Upon request of the head of a department, the Attorney Gen-
eral, or under his direction the District Attorney of any county in
which the proceeding is brought, shall aid in any investigation, hear-
ing, prosecution or trial had under the laws which the department is
required to administer, and shall institute and prosecute all necessary
actions and proceedings for the enforcement of such law and for the
punishment of all violations thereof.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11157 (West 1968).
89. See notes I 1 through 16 and accompanying text supra.
90. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3479 (West 1970). See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3480
(West 1970).
91. People v. Selby Smelting & Lead Co., 163 Cal. 84, 124 P. 692 (1912).
See also McCarthy v. Gaston Ridge Mill & Min. Co., 144 Cal. 542, 78 P.
7 (1904) (water pollution); Morton v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. App. 2d 321,
269 P.2d 81 (1954) (land use); Note, 7 CALIF. L. REV. 445 (1919) (air pollu-
tion). Cf. Hicks v. Michael, 15 Cal. 107 (1860) (waste); Monterey Oil Co.
v. City Court of Seal Beach, 120 Cal. App. 2d 31, 260 P.2d 846 (1953) (beach
access); People v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 127 Cal. App. 30, 15 P.2d 549
(1932) (protection of wild animals); Hasbrouck v. Cavill, 54 Cal. App. 1, 200
P. 979 (1921) (forest and wilderness areas); Melvin v. E.B. & A.L. Stone Co.,
7 Cal. App. 327, 94 P. 390 (1908) (noise pollution); CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §
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tions define certain actions to be public nuisances and authorize
their abatement. 92
In counties having both a district attorney and a county
counsel, there is some question as to whether both officers may
bring such an action, and if both may not, in whom the authority
resides. When a county counsel is appointed, he is usually
charged with all the civil duties previously conferred upon the
district attorney,9" and a nuisance abatement action is generally
considered "civil" in nature. 4 However, in Board of Supervisors
v. Simpson"5 the California Supreme Court held that despite
these principles, the Los Angeles County District Attorney was
the proper party to bring a nuisance abatement action under the
Red Light Abatement Act.96 Initially, the court examined the
various provisions of the Los Angeles County Charter and e-
731a (West 1970) (which permits nuisances to continue in certain zoned areas).
See generally Jarvis v. Santa Clara Valley R.R. Co., 52 Cal. 438 (1877) (riv-
ers); Oil and Gas, Regulation of Production to Prevent Surface Nuisances, 4
HAST. L. J. 173 (1953) (oil).
92. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5460-65 (West Supp. 1973) (unau-
thorized erection of billboards); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 2558-59 (West
1972) (unauthorized operation of placer mines); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 3600-
05 (West 1971) (oil wells in certain areas); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 4375
(West 1971) (unlawfully maintained dumps); CAL. WATER CODE § 13950 (West
1971); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 4441 (West 1971); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§ 4713 (West 1971) (harmful insect and plant diseases); CAL. ST'Ts. & H'WAYS
CODE § 1484-86 (West 1966) (obstructing public highways). See also El Do-
rado County v. Al. Tahoe Inv. Co., 175 Cal. App. 2d 401, 346 P.2d 205 (1959);
People v. Power, 38 Cal. App. 181, 175 P. 803 (1918); CAL. AGRIC. CODE §
5401 (West 1969) (infested plants); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50230 et seq. (West
1968) (abandoned excavations); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 2270 (West
1971) (mosquito breeding places); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 5411 (West
1970) (discharge of sewage in a manner that will create contamination, pollution
or nuisance); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 8H 14931-32 (weeds); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 17980-89 (West 1971) (unsafe or unsanitary
buildings); CAL. WATER CODE § 305-06 (West 1971) (uncapped artesian
wells); CAL. WATER CODE § 13950 (West 1971) (cesspools in certain areas).
Cf. Skinner v. Coy, 13 Cal. 2d 407, 90 P.2d 296 (1934); Graham v. King-
well, 218 Cal. 658, 24 P.2d 488 (1933); Los Angeles County v. Spencer, 126
Cal. 670, 59 P. 202 (1899); CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 5551 (West 1969) (abandoned
or neglected crops); CAL. AGRic. CODE § 5552 (West 1969); CAL. AGRIC. CODE
H8 5904 et seq., 5931 et seq. (West 1969) (certain plants); CAL. AGRIC. CODE
§ 6171 et seq. (West 1969) (certain trees); CAL. AGRIc. CODE § 7576 et seq.
(West 1971) (infested seeds); CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 9621 et seq., (West 1969)
(infected animals); CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 14701 et seq. (West 1969) (mislabeled
plant treatments); CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 27801 et seq. (West 1969) (rotten eggs);
CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 29151 et seq., 29218 et seq. (West 1969) (unsafe beehives);
CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 52511 et seq. (West 1969) (unsafe seed); CAL. AGRIC.
CODE § 52981 et seq. (West 1969) (infested cotton).
93. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 26529, 27642, 27645 (West 1968).
94. See Board of Supervisors v. Simpson, 36 Cal. 2d 671, 672, 227 P.2d 14,
15 (1951).
95. Id.
96. See 15 Op. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 231 (1950) where the question was decided
in an identical manner.
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termined that the Los Angeles County Counsel's Office did not
inherit the general powers set forth in the Government Code and
applicable to most counties. The court held however, that even
assuming that the Government Code provisions applied, the
county district attorney was nevertheless the appropriate officer
to bring the action. That holding was based on three principle
factors: (1) several applicable code sections stated that the dis-
trict attorney was authorized to bring a nuisance abatement ac-
tion;97 (2) the abatement action was somewhat in the nature of
a forfeiture and thus should be brought by the district attorney
under his power to "prosecute actions for fines, penalties, and
forfeitures;"9 and (3) although a nuisance action is civil in na-
ture, a nuisance action under the Red Light Abatement Act aids
the enforcement of criminal law.
Whether these factors would be controlling in the case of en-
vironmentally destructive public nuisances is debatable. As the
Simpson court noted, many code sections authorize the district
attorney to bring nuisance abatement actions. 99 However, these
sections should be construed in light of Government Code section
26529 which provides that when a county counsel is appointed,
he shall discharge the civil duties of the district attorney. 100 Sec-
ond, the Simpson court's "forfeiture" rationale was weak in the
context of that case and is even more so in the case of environ-
mentally harmful public nuisances. For although abatement of
some nuisances may involve something in the nature of a for-
feiture (that is, destruction of billboards, abatement of weeds),
many abatements control rather than confiscate (for example, con-
trol of noise, air and water pollution).1 1 Third, although all
public nuisances are classified as crimes, 10 2 criminal proceedings
are much less likely to follow abatement of environmentally harm-
ful nuisances than abatement of houses of prostitution. Moreover,
97. See CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 731 (West 1955); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 26528
(West 1968).
98. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 26500-02, 26521 (West 1968).
99. Board of Supervisors v. Simpson, 36 Cal. 2d 671, 227 P.2d 14 (1951);
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 26528 (West 1968). See People v. Wheeler, 30 Cal. App.
3d 282, 294, 106 Cal. Rptr. 260, 269 (1973).
100. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 26529 (West 1968). See also CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 27642, 27645 (West 1968).
101. See notes 91 and 92 supra.
102. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5464 (West Supp. 1973); CAL. PEN.
CODE §§ 369(h), 370 et seq. (West 1970); CAL. Pun. REs. CODE § 4441 (West
1972); CAL. S'TS. & H'WAYS CODE § 724 (West 1969); CAL. WATER CODE §
13265 (West 1971). See also 49 OP. CAL. ATT'y GEN. 121 (1967) in which
the question of who held the nuisance abatement power was decided on the ra-
tionale of parallel criminal prosecutions. The opinion notes that "the particular




if the relative expertise of the two offices is compared, the county
counsel would seem to be in a superior position since his office is
theoretically more familiar with civil suits and with the various
boards and districts that may become involved.'
It is thus apparent that the determination of which county
attorney is authorized to bring a nuisance abatement action is
open to considerable question. Should this issue arise in the fu-
ture, the most reasonable way to resolve the dispute would be
to declare that either the district attorney or the county counsel
has the authority to bring the action. Such a decision would recog-
nize the numerous practical factors facing the two offices which
undoubtedly vary from one county to the next, and would provide
the officer most capable of pursuing the action with the necessary
authority to do so. Furthermore, allowing concurrent authority
over nuisance abatement actions would serve as an effective check
on the discretion to decline to take such action"' and would be
in accord with the recent trend in the environmental area of es-
tablishing concurrent authority among governmental entities over
particular environmental problems. 105  Additionally, this result
would not be inconsistent with Simpson, in that the question in
that case was not who was authorized to bring the action but
whether the district attorney was required to do so when ordered
by the Board of Supervisors. 106
Moreover, the county attorney has special air pollution con-
trol powers under various control acts. 10 7 As mentioned above,
the elimination of traditional proof requirements in equity ac-
tions under these acts permits many suits to succeed that previously
would have failed. 08 Again, there is some question whether the
county counsel or the district attorney is the proper party to bring
the action. All of these legislative enactments indicate that the
action is to be brought on behalf of "the people," but do not
specify exactly who is to bring the action. 09 Since it is a "civil
103. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27642, 27645 (West 1968).
104. See text, section IV, B infra.
105. See Orange County Air Pollution Control Dist. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n,
4 Cal. 3d 945, 484 P.2d 1361, 95 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1971). See also CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 24360.7, 25181, 39262 (West Supp. 1973); CAL. CIv. PRO.
CODE § 731 (West 1955) (providing for concurrent authority over particular ac-
tions).
106. Board of Supervisors v. Simpson, 36 Cal. 2d 671, 672, 227 P.2d 14, 15
(1951).
107. See generally Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 374, 97
Cal. Rptr. 639 (1971).
108. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24252, 24360.7, 39437 (West Supp.
1973). See CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 526 (West 1954).




action," it may be that the appointed county counsel is the proper
party;110 but, since the nature of an air pollution action is similar
to nuisance abatement actions, the conservative reasoning employed
in Simpson may apply to make the district attorney the proper
party."1  Again, the most logical conclusion would be to permit
either officer to bring the action, thus establishing concurrent au-
thority over air pollution control.'1 2
C. Powers of City Attorneys
As the legal representative of an incorporated city, the city
attorney also possesses certain limited environmental powers that
can be used to preserve the environment. These powers relate to
nuisance abatement and possibly to air pollution control. The city
attorney has the power to abate all public nuisances so pre-
scribed by state statute." 3  Consequently, he also is empowered
to take action in such areas as air pollution, water pollution, land
use and solid waste control. 114  Since, in addition to the custo-
mary nuisance powers derived from the state, the legislative body
of every city is authorized to declare by ordinance what consti-
tutes a nuisance, 1 5 the city attorney possesses additional environ-
mental protection powers incident to his power to enforce city
ordinances by criminal or civil action."16
The city attorney may also be authorized to enjoin viola-
tions of various air pollution control acts. 1 7  Since these acts do
not specify who may bring the action,"a8 the city attorney, as a
representative of the people, may well be authorized to enjoin the
discharge of air contaminants." 9 The importance of proceeding
110. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 26529, 27642, 27645 (West 1968).
111. See notes 93-103 and accompanying text supra.
112. See note 105 and accompanying text supra.
113. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3494 (West 1970); CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 731
(West 1955); City of Bakersfield v. Miller, 64 Cal. 2d 93, 410 P.2d 393, 48
Cal. Rptr. 889 (1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 988 (1966); 15 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen.
231 (1950).
114. See notes 91 and 92 supra.
115. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 38771 (West 1968). See City of Escondido v. Des-
ert Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 8 Cal. 3d 785, 505 P.2d 1012, 106 Cal. Rptr.
172 (1973). See also note 90 and accompanying text supra.
116. City of Bakersfield v. Miller, 64 Cal. 2d 93, 410 P.2d 393, 48 Cal. Rptr.
889 (1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 988 (1966). See CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 8 (West
1968).
117. See generally Orange County Air Pollution Control Dist. v. Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 4 Cal. 3d 785, 484 P.2d 1361, 95 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1971); Environmental
Defense Fund v. California Air Resources Bd., 30 Cal. App. 3d 829, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 260 (1973); Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 374, 97
Cal. Rptr. 639 (1971).
118. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24252, 39437 (West Supp. 1973).
119. Although no decision has been found which is directly on point, city
attorneys have traditionally brought normal nuisance actions in the name of "The
[Vol. 14
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under these acts is, of course, that in So doing the city attorney
need not allege nor prove inadequacy of remedy at law or irrep-
arable injury in order to obtain an injunction. 120
III. COMMON-LAW POWERS
Above and beyond the statutory powers possessed by the at-
torney general, county attorney and city attorney, the legal repre-
sentatives of the people traditionally retain broad powers under
the common law to take action to protect the public interest.12 1
In California, the general rule is that the common law is still in ef-
fect unless overturned by statute.' 22
As chief law officer of the state, the California Attorney Gen-
eral is generally held to possess the common-law power to represent
the interests of the people. 23  In Pierce v. Superior Court,24
the supreme court held that the Attorney General has broad com-
mon-law powers to file any civil action or proceeding which directly
involves the rights or interests of the state, or which he considers
necessary for the enforcement of the laws of the state, the preserva-
tion of order, and the protection of rights and interests of the
People." See, e.g., People v. Hawley, 207 Cal. 395, 279 P. 136 (1929); People
v. Greene, 264 Cal. App. 2d 774, 70 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1968). Furthermore, city
attorneys have been permitted to bring criminal actions under the Air Pollution
Control District Act of 1947, [CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24198 et seq.
(West 1967)] without any question as to their authority. See People v. Southern
Pac. Co., 150 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 831, 311 P.2d 200 (1957); People v. Plywood
Mfrs. of Cal., 137 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 859, 291 P.2d 587 (1955). It is likely
that a violation of any of these acts occurring within the geographical limit of
a city may be abated by the city attorney on behalf of "The People." In this
connection, many of the arguments previously advanced for concurrent authority
of the district attorney and county counsel over nuisances are equally applicable
here. See notes 104 and 105 and accompanying text supra.
120. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39437 (West Supp. 1973). Note also
that a city may have legal rights in environmental actions simply as a private
entity. Thus, in Town of Antioch v. Williams Irrigation District, 188 Cal. 451,
205 P. 688 (1922) the city sought an injunction against upstream appropriators
of water on the grounds that the city was both a riparian owner and a user
of water. The court upheld the city's standing to sue but reversed on the merits.
Id. at 468, 205 P. at 690 (1922).
121. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE COMMON LAW (Jones Ed. 1961),
1529-32, 1839, 2050; 6 CAL. JuR. 2d Attorney General § 6 (1967); 7 C.J.S.
Attorney General § 5 (1937); 7 AM. JuR. 2d Attorney General § 6 (1963).
122. CAL. CIv. CODE § 22.2 (1970) provides that the common law of Eng-
land shall be the law of California unless repugnant to the laws of the state
or the prevailing laws of the United States. See 10 CAL. JuR. 2d Common Law
§§ 1-4 (1953).
123. In People ex rel. Pixley v. Stratton, 25 Cal. 242 (1864), the supreme
court held that the common law power of the people's legal representative would
prevail unless specifically precluded. Accord, People v. Centro Mart, 34 Cal.
2d 702, 214 P.2d 378 (1950); Pierce v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d 759, 37 P.2d
460 (1934). For similar holdings in other states, see 7 AM. Jun. 2d Attorney
General § 6 (1963).
124. 1 Cal. 2d 759, 37 P.2d 460 (1934).
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public. Subsequently, in Don Wilson Builders v. Superior Court,1 25
the court of appeal held that the Attorney General has the power
under the common law to file a civil action to enjoin unlawful ra-
cial discrimination in housing. In a lengthy and vigorous dis-
sent, Justice Fourt noted that the Pierce decision was handed down
four days before the voters enacted article V, section 21 of the
California constitution 126 which set forth the particular powers of
the Attorney General. Justice Fourt argued that the powers delin-
eated in the constitution are the sole powers the Attorney Gen-
eral possesses. According to this argument the enactment of the
constitutional provisions pre-empted the common law powers of
the Attorney General.' 27  Although this view has merit, recent
decisions of the California appellate courts indicate that the At-
torney General still retains his broad powers under the common
law.' 2
8
Regardless of the status of these common-law powers, they
are infrequently used in the environmental field because of the
availability of broad statutory powers to abate nuisances and pro-
tect the state's natural resources. 129  Nevertheless, the continued
retention of common-law powers provides the Attorney General
with the capacity to file practically any action necessary to protect
the environment although such action is not necessarily authorized
by statute.8 0
125. 220 Cal. App. 2d 77, 33 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1963).
126. Now CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13.
127. Accord, State v. Davidson, 33 N.M. 664, 275 P. 373, 375 (1937); State
v. Industrial Comm'n, 172 Wis. 415, 179 N.W. 579, 580 (1934). See also Peo-
ple v. Brophy, 49 Cal. App. 2d 15, 120 P.2d 946 (1942) (where the power of
Attorney General Earl Warren to send a letter to the phone company requesting
discontinuance of a customer's service on the grounds of illegal gambling was
challenged. The court held that even though the customer was allegedly involved
in gambling interests, the Attorney General had no power to act in this manner).
128. People ex rel. Lynch v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 910, 912 n.1, 464
P.2d 126, 127 n.1, 83 Cal. Rptr. 670, 671 n.1 (1970); People v. San Diego Uni-
fied School District, 19 Cal. App. 3d 252, 252, 96 Cal. Rptr. 658, 661 (1971).
See also cases cited note 130 infra.
129. See text, section 11, A supra.
130. Although the definitions of "nuisance" and "natural resource" are ex-
tremely broad (see CAL. CIv. CODE § 3479 (West 1970); CAL. GOV'T CODE §
12605 (West Supp. 1973)) the cases brought under the Attorney General's com-
mon-law power indicate an even broader ability to act on behalf of the people.
See generally People v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 19 Cal. App. 3d 252,
96 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1971) (action to compel the school board to eliminate racial
imbalance in the public schools); People er rel. Mosk v. Lyman, 253 Cal. App.
2d 959, 61 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1967); Brown v. Memorial Nat'l Home Foundation,
162 Cal. App. 2d 513, 329 P.2d 118 (1958) (action to settle control of a char-
itable trust).
In addition to the traditional injunction action, a theory has been put forth
to the effect that the people are beneficiaries of the environment held in trust
by the government. See Cohen, The Constitution, The Public Trust, and the
Environment, 1970 UTAH L. REv. 388; Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natu-
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Though local government attorneys have certain environ-
mental protection powers in the area of nuisance abatement and
air pollution, it is doubtful whether the common-law power of
the Attorney General extends past his office and concurrently re-
sides in local government attorneys. The California courts
consistently have held that counties are agents of the state, possess-
ing only the authority conferred upon them by the legislature.1"1
Similarly, cities are municipal corporations and possess only those
powers expressly permitted them by the legislature. 8 2  Ap-
parently then, neither county attorneys nor city attorneys inherit
the Attorney General's common-law powers without an express
authorization from the legislature.
Although there are no decisions precisely on point, several
cases support this position by indicating that actions brought by
local government attorneys are limited to those authorized by
statute. In San Diego County v. Central Southern Ry. Co., 88
the district attorney brought an action to recover delinquent state
and county taxes. The court dismissed the action, even though
the taxes were in fact due, on the grounds that the district attorney
was not expressly authorized to bring the action.' 84 In Ventura
County v. Clay,3 5 the district attorney filed suit against the
county treasurer. Again the court dismissed the action on the
grounds that it was beyond the express statutory authority of the
district attorney. 30  It should be noted, however, that some au-
thority exists which would support the right of local government
attorneys to maintain actions not specifically authorized by stat-
ute.'8 7
ral Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. REV. 471 (1970);
Comment, Environmental Law: New Legal Concepts in the Anti-Pollution Fight,
36 Mo. L. REV. 78 (1971); Comment, The Environmental Lawsuit: Traditional
Doctrines and Evolving Theories to Control Pollution, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 1085
(1970).
131. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 23003 et seq. (West 1968). See In re Miller's Es-
tate, 5 Cal. 2d 588, 55 P.2d 491 (1936); Los Angeles County v. Riley, 6 Cal.
2d 625, 59 P.2d 139 (1936); 29 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 183 (1957).
132. Griffin v. Colusa County, 44 Cal. App. 2d 915, 113 P.2d 270 (1941);
City of Roseville v. Tulley, 55 Cal. App. 2d 601, 131 P.2d 395 (1943). See
CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
133. 1 P. 897 (1884).
134. Id. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 23004 (West 1968).
135. 119 Cal. 213, 51 P. 189 (1897).
136. Id. Another case demonstrating local government attorney's lack of
common-law power is People v. City of Los Angeles, 160 Cal. App. 2d 494,
325 P.2d 639 (1958). The City of Manhattan Beach attempted to enforce a
judgment obtained by the Attorney General under his common-law powers which
prohibited the City of Los Angeles from dumping sewage into Santa Monica
Bay. The court dismissed the action on the grounds that the city had no power
to exercise the state's common-law powers.
137. See, e.g., Flemming v. Hance, 153 Cal. 162, 94 P. 620 (1908); Modoc
County v. Spencer, 103 Cal. 498, 37 P. 483 (1894). Both of these cases found
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IV. SPECIFIC PROBLEM AREAS
A. The Problem of Pre-emption
Clearly, state and local government attorneys have broad
general and specific powers which can be used to protect the en-
vironment. Because of the diversity of these powers, and the ever
increasing number of boards, special districts, and varied methods
of protecting the environment, 3 8 the question arises as to whether
any of these general powers are pre-empted by more recently en-
acted specific ones. 139
The general test as to whether a particular area is pre-empted
is whether the legislature, by its specific enactments, has mani-
fested an intent to "occupy the field."'140 In the area of general
powers of governmental attorneys, such pre-emption can occur in
one of two ways: by specifying a particular method of meeting
a specified problem, thus implying the exclusion of other poten-
tial methods; or by thoroughly covering a particular field by stat-
ute, indicating an intention to preclude further involvement by
other governmental entities.
Both methods of pre-emption were found by the court in
People v. New Penn Mines, Inc.141 In that case, the Attorney
General had brought an action to abate a public nuisance caused
by drainage of toxic mine wastes into the Mokelumne River.
The defendant demurred on the ground that the Attorney Gen-
eral's power to bring such an action was pre-empted by the enact-
ment of the Dickey Water Pollution Act.'42 On appeal, the court
examined the entire scheme of the act and determined that although
that the district attorney represents the sovereign power of the state. See also
Elser v. Gill Net Number One, 246 Cal. App. 2d 30, 54 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1966)
where the district attorney was permitted to bring an action that should have
been brought by the Attorney General.
138. See notes 4 and 5 supra.
139. See generally Allen & Sawyer, The California City versus Preemption
by Implication, 17 HAST. L. J. 603 (1966).
140. Stated in more detail, pre-emption by state law occurs if one of three
tests is met:
(1) the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered by
general law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a mat-
ter of state concern;
(2) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law
couched in such terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state
concern will not tolerate further or additional local action; or
(3) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law, and
the subject is of such nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance
on the transient citizens of the state outweighs the possible benefit to
the municipality.
In re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 128, 396 P.2d 809, 815, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393,
399 (1964); quoted with approval in People v. Mueller, 8 Cal. App. 3d 949,
88 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1970).
141. 212 Cal. App. 2d 667, 28 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1963).
142. See CAL. WATER CODE § 13000 et seq. (West 1971).
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the act expressly disclaimed pre-emption of local government pow-
ers, it contained no express reservation regarding the Attorney
General's power. The court concluded that the legislature in-
tended to preclude the Attorney General from taking any inde-
pendent action because the act only provided for his participa-
tion upon request by the Regional Board, and because the com-
prehensive statutory scheme was deemed conclusive.
143
Several years after the New Penn Mines decision, a court of
appeal in People v. Union Oil144 reached an apparently contradic-
tory conclusion. The defendant in Union Oil was criminally
prosecuted for discharging oil into state waters in violation of
the Fish and Game Code.145  He demurred on the ground that
the Dickey Water Pollution Act pre-empted criminal penalties
in this situation. 46 The court disagreed, holding that the various
remedies for such violations were complementary rather than con-
tradictory, and that the scope of the act did not indicate a legisla-
iive intent to exclude criminal penalties.
The apparent conflict between New Penn Mines and Union
Oil illustrates how easily the issue of pre-emption can arise, and
the incident difficulty dealing with the problem. In New Penn
Mines, the court relied on the fact that the Attorney General's
participation was provided for in the act only when he was re-
quested to take action by the Regional Board.1 47  Similar rea-
soning could be applied in like situations where a particular gov-
ernmental attorney's participation is separately provided for by
statute."" Under this reasoning, a statute specifying that a gov-
ernmental attorney is to take action under certain conditions could
be interpreted as limiting his involvement to that action only.
Additionally, the court in the New Penn Mines case relied on
the fact that a particular entity, the Regional Water Pollution Con-
trol Board, had primary authority to regulate the type of pollu-
tion in question in accordance with the statutory scheme.1 49 Un-
der this rationale, any statute vesting primary authority over a
problem in a particular agency can be construed as precluding
other governmental entities from becoming involved. 150
143. People v. New Penn Mines, Inc., 212 Cal. App. 2d 667, 675, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 337, 343 (1963).
144. 268 Cal. App. 2d 566, 74 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1968).
145. See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 5650 (West 1958).
146. See CAL. WATER CODE § 13000 et seq. (West 1971).
147. The New Penn Mines decision has been specifically overturned by the
legislature. See CAL. WATER CODE § 13063 (West 1971); Lynch and Stevens,
Environmental Law-The Uncertain Trumpet, 5 U.S.F. L. REv. 10, 23-4 (1970).
148. See, e.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §5800 (West 1958).
149. See People v. New Penn Mines, Inc., 212 Cal. App. 2d 667, 673, 28
Cal. Rptr. 337, 339-40 (1963).
150. For cases involving general pre-emption of local governmental powers in
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Generally, the state legislature has been careful to expressly
disclaim pre-emption when enacting various pieces of environ-
mental legislation.' Nevertheless, the problem of pre-emption
cannot be easily resolved. In Orange County Air Pollution
Control District v. Public Utilities Commission,'52 the California
Supreme Court held that both the local district and the Public
Utilities Commission had concurrent authority over the construc-
tion of power plants which emitted contaminants into the air.
In so holding the court pointed out that air pollution was a mat-
ter of state-wide concern. The court noted that several statutes
in the 1947 Air Pollution Control District Act purported to dis-
claim pre-emption of existing and future local ordinances.' 58 The
court stated, however, that the possible validity of local pollution
controls obviously has no effect on the validity of district regula-
tion of non-local matters.'" By adding this conclusion, the court
expressed its belief that regardless of whether pre-emption is ex-
pressly disclaimed, some matters are of such overriding concern to
the welfare of the entire state that local ordinances and public nui-
sance actions are incapable of effectively regulating them. One
illustration will suffice to demonstrate the complexity of the prob-
lem. If various cities and counties began enforcing different ex-
haust emission standards, or several independent governmental
attorneys began instituting nuisance actions against vehicular
emissions based on divergent standards, intrastate commerce could
quickly grind to a halt. Accordingly, although the legislature
may have expressly disclaimed pre-emption in certain areas, it is
doubtful that these disclaimers will be interpreted as being ab-
solute. Rather, it is readily inferable that such disclaimers may
be held to apply only to ordinances or actions covering prob-
lems of purely "local concern." 155
It should be pointed out that the recently enacted compre-
hensive statutory powers of the Attorney General greatly diminish
the environmental area, see Castiglione v. County of San Diego, 15 Cal. App.
3d 880, 93 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1971) (permit requirement not pre-empted by lack
of relevant zoning ordinance); People v. Mueller, 8 Cal. App. 3d 949, 88 Cal.
Rptr. 157 (1970) (water pollution ordinance held not pre-empted). See also
People v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 268 Cal. App. 2d 501, 74 Cal. Rptr.
222 (1968) (where the court held that local governments could not validly control
air pollution caused by trains without violating the interstate commerce clause).
151. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5227 (West Supp. 1973); CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 39054.1 (West Supp. 1973); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 2558-
59 (West 1972); CAL. WATER CODE § 13002 (West 1971).
152. 4 Cal. 3d 945, 484 P.2d 1361, 95 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1971).
153. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24199(b), 24247-49 (West 1967).
154. 4 Cal. 3d at 953,484 P.2d at 1366, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 22 (1971).
155. See Orange County Air Pollution Control Dist. v. Public Util. Comm'n,
4 Cal. 3d 945, 953, 484 P.2d 1361, 1366, 95 Cal. Rptr. 17, 22 (1971).
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the possibility of a court's holding that certain general powers
of the Attorney General have been pre-empted.1'5 Nevertheless,
that possibility still remains. For instance, an action seeking to
enjoin the operation of all automobiles in the state is clearly a
decision which should be left to the legislature. This point was
demonstrated in the recent case of Diamond v. General Mo-
tors. 57  In Diamond, a private citizen brought a class ac-
tion seeking to enjoin the sale and registration of automobiles
which pollute the environment. The court declined relief, indi-
cating that the legislature was attempting to deal with the prob-
lem, and that an issue with such a significant impact on the econ-
omy and the welfare of the state is one of legislative and not judi-
cial concern. Although the court did not discuss the power of the
Attorney General to bring such a suit, the reasoning of the court
manifestly demonstrates that regardless of who the plaintiff may
be, such relief will be considered beyond the court's authority
and an invasion of legislative prerogatives. The Attorney General's
capacity in such matters is nominally quite broad, but in effect
limited to relief which the courts will allow.
B. Mandamus to Require Action
In the preceding discussion, it has been demonstrated
that state and local government attorneys, especially the Attorney
General, have broad legal and equitable powers that can be used
to protect the environment. In the use of these powers, however,
the government attorney may decline to take action on a particu-
lar matter. Should this occur, a private citizen may be able to
compel the appropriate action through a writ of mandamus.
Section 1085 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a writ
of mandate may be issued "to any inferior tribunal, corporation,
board or person to compel the performance of an act which
the law specially enjoins.""' Under this section, a state or local
government attorney can be compelled by mandamus to perform
a duty required by law. The cases dealing with mandamus ac-
tions against government attorneys turn on the question of whether
the particular action is a required duty, and if so, under what
circumstances it may be compelled.' 59
1. Mandatory Duties
Mandatory duties are either absolute or qualified. An ab-
156. See text, section II, A, 2 supra.
157. 20 Cal. App. 3d 374, 97 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1971).
158. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1085 (West 1955).
159. Board of Supervisors v. Simpson, 36 Cal. 2d 671, 227 P.2d 14 (1951);
Blankenship v. Michalski, 155 Cal. App. 2d 672, 318 P.2d 727 (1957).
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solute duty was exemplified in Board of Supervisors v. Simp-
son.160 There a writ of mandate was sought to compel the dis-
trict attorney to institute a nuisance abatement proceeding. The
plaintiffs relied on the wording of Government Code section
26528, which declares:
The district attorney may, and when directed by the
board of supervisors shall, bring a civil action in the name
of the people of the State of California to abate a public
nuisance in his county.' 6 '
On the basis of this section, the court held that since the board
of supervisors had directed the district attorney to take the action,
the duty of the district attorney to commence the proceedings was
mandatory.' 62  The determination of whether a nuisance existed
had been made by the board of supervisors. Once this deter-
mination had been made, the district attorney's mandatory duty
became absolute.
As illustrated in Blankenship v. Michalski,' a "mandatory"
duty may be qualified. There, a private citizen sought manda-
mus against a city attorney to compel him to institute abatement
proceedings against a zoning violation. As in the Simpson case,
the applicable ordinance specified that the city attorney "shall"
commence all necessary actions for the removal of zoning viola-
tions. Here, however, the determination of the facts necessary
to institute proceedings was to be made by the city attorney, not
by the board of supervisors as in Simpson. Because of this dis-
tinction, the Blankenship court indicated that the question of
whether a violation existed was reasonably debatable, and held
that the city attorney could not be compelled by mandamus to
institute proceedings unless a violation was "clear and obvious."
Unfortunately, the court declined to elaborate on the meaning
of "clear and obvious" and thus failed to establish a meaningful
precedent in the area. The Blankenship decision illustrates the
notion of "qualified" mandatory duties; the qualification in that
case was the initial determination by the city attorney as to
whether the zoning violation existed at all.1
6 4
160. 36 Cal. 2d 671, 227 P.2d 14 (1951).
161. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 26528 (West 1968) (emphasis added).
162. Board of Supervisors v. Simpson, 36 Cal. 2d 671, 675, 227 P.2d 14, 17
(1951).
163. 155 Cal. App. 2d 672, 318 P.2d 727 (1957).
164. Id. at 675, 318 P.2d at 729 (1957). See also Wilson v. Sharp, 42 Cal.
2d 675, 268 P.2d 1062 (1954) (where a taxpayer sought damages against a county
counsel for failure to institute a cause of action accruing to the county for the
illegal expenditure of funds). The statute authorizing the cause of action provided
that the district attorney (or in this case the county counsel) "shall" institute
the suit. The court held that since both the determination of whether there had
been a violation and whether the facts were sufficient to warrant the action were
within the county counsel's discretion, the established rule that public officers
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In the area of environmental protection duties, many statutes
provide for mandatory duties that may be either absolute or qual-
ified. For example, Water Code section 13331 provides that the
Attorney General "shall" seek an injunction' 65 to enforce an order
of the Water Quality Control Board when requested by the
board.' Under the authority of Board of Supervisors v. Simp-
son, the Attorney General could be compelled by mandamus to
take such action once the Water Quality Control Board requests it;
since the determination of a violation is made by another body,
the duty to institute the proceeding is absolute. On the other
hand, statutes such as Fish and Game Code section 5800 provide
that the district attorney "shall" institute proceedings against wa-
ter pollution in the Trinity and Klamath River district. 117  How-
ever, the determination of whether a violation exists remains with
the district attorney. Thus, under the holding of Blankenship,
he could be compelled by mandamus to commence proceedings
only if the violation is "clear and obvious."
2. Discretionary Duties
If mandamus is sought to compel the exercise of a discre-
tionary duty, the standard of judicial review is stricter than it is for
compelling the exercise of a mandatory duty. In City of Camp-
bell v. Mosk,'6 8 mandamus was sought to compel the Attorney
General to grant the city permission to sue in quo warranto. The
court pointed out that the statute in question 169 declared that the
Attorney General "may" grant such permission, and found that the
action sought to be compelled was wholly discretionary in nature.
The court concluded that to "justify court intervention, the abuse
of discretion by the Attorney General must be extreme and clearly
indefensible."' 7 °  By use of strong and definitive language to es-
tablish a standard of review, the court made it virtually impos-
sible to compel the exercise of wholly discretionary duties by man-
damus.
are not liable for failure to exercise their discretion in a particular manner should
be followed.
165. CAL. WATER CODE § 13331 (West 1970).
166. See also CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13340, 13350 (West 1971).
167. CAL. FiSH & GAME CODE § 5800 (West 1958).
168. 197 Cal. App. 2d 640, 17 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1961).
169. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 803 (West 1955) provides in part:
An action may be brought by the attorney-general, in the name of
the people of this state . . . upon a complaint of a private party,
against any person . . .or against any corporation, either de jure or de
facto, which usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises any
franchise, within this state. And the attorney-general must bring the
action, whenever he has reason to believe that any such office or fran-
chise has been usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercisedby any person, or when he is directed to do so by the governor.
170. 197 Cal. App. 2d at 648, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 590 (1961).
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Under this "extreme and clearly indefensible abuse of dis-
cretion" standard, the use of many environmental protection pow-
ers is left almost totally within the discretion of the respective
government attorney. For example, Public Resources Code section
2558 declares that a district attorney or city attorney "may" en-
join certain placer mine operations which dangerously pollute a
city's water.' 7 ' Similarly, Health and Safety Code section 39437
declares that a civil action "may" be brought to enjoin certain
types of air pollution. 172 Under the holding in City of Camp-
bell v. Mosk 78 a court could compel the use of those powers only
if the authorized government attorney was "clear and extreme"
in the abuse of his discretion, a matter not easily subject to
proof. 17 4
V. CONCLUSION
The attorney general, county attorneys and city attorneys
possess numerous powers that can be used to protect the environ-
ment. The Attorney General possesses powers through his rep-
resentation of state agencies, his involvement in state legal mat-
ters and his control over actions involving counties.' 75  He has
broad independent powers under the common law,' 76 the Gov-
ernment Code, the nuisance abatement statutes and by virtue of
his special air and water quality powers. 77  On the other hand,
county and city attorneys have only limited powers in relatively
few areas. County attorneys possess certain powers through their
representation of local agencies and districts, their actions on be-
half of the state under the direction of the Attorney General, and
their penal powers. 178  Both county and city attorneys have the
power to abate nuisances, and they also possess special air pollu-
tion control powers under the Mulford-Carrell Air Resources
Act.179
Although the powers of some government attorneys in the
environmental area are extremely broad, there are still several
areas in which expansion of those powers is desirable. Primar-
ily, the limited power of local government attorneys should be
171. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 2558 (West 1972).
172. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39437 (West Supp. 1973).
173. 197 Cal. App. 2d 640, 17 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1961).
174. Id. See also CAL. Gov'T CODE § 26528 (West 1968).
175. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11042 (West 1966) provides that:
No state agency shall employ any legal counsel other than the At-
torney General, or one of his assistants or deputies, in any matter in
which the agency is interested.
176. See notes 121-30 and accompanying text supra.
177. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39000 et seq. (West Supp.
1973); CAL. WATER CODE § 13262 (West 1971).
178. See notes 78-87 and accompanying text supra.
179. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39261 (West Supp. 1973).
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expanded. Local government attorneys now have narrow au-
thority in the areas of public nuisance abatement and con-
trol of air pollution violations. Although the Attorney General
has very broad statutory and common-law powers that can be
used for the preservation of the environment, the Attorney
General's Environmental Law Unit presently consists of only
ten attorneys' 80 in contrast to the thousands of businesses and
private individuals who continue to pollute the environment.
Clearly this unit should be expanded. But even if this is accom-
plished, in order to further facilitate the protection of the environ-
ment, local government attorneys should be given broader au-
thority. This would permit them to deal with environmental
problems not brought to the attention of the Attorney General or
not of sufficient importance to warrant the Attorney General's
intervention.
Secondly, the elimination of traditional equity requirements
for injunctive relief should become the rule rather than the excep-
tion in environmental protection actions. The Dickey Water Pol-
lution Act, the Mulford-Carrell Air Resources Act, and the 1947
California Air Pollution Control District Act have eliminated the
traditional equity requirements of alleging and proving inade-
quacy of the remedy at law and irreparable injury in equity ac-
tions brought by authorized government attorneys.181 The elimi-
nation of these requirements enables many actions that would or-
dinarily fail to succeed due to proof problems. In the opinion of
the author, this is a worthwhile change and should be expanded
to encompass the entire field of environmental actions. Should this
occur, actions in many other environmentally-related areas, such
as cessation of waste, noise pollution and destruction of wildlife
would receive an added stimulus.
Finally, one further change is needed to facilitate protection
of the environment; that is the requirement that a judge deter-
mine the questions of fact in equity matters. It is uniformly held
in California that in equity actions, such as nuisance abatement,
the function of a jury is advisory only.8 2 In the field of environ-
mental protection, however, the importance of the decision to both
the local community and society as a whole mandates that any de-
cision be made by those who best represent the people. A judge
180. Letter from Larry C. King, Deputy Attorney General, State of Califor-
nia, to author, November 8, 1972.
181. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24252 (West Supp. 1973); CAL.
WATER CODE § 13361(c) (West 1971).
182. Moore v. San Vicente Lumber Co., 175 Cal. 212 (1917); Williamson
v. Tobey, 86 Cal. 493 (1890); City of Turlock v. Bristow, 103 Cal. App. 750
(1928). See also Note, Equity, Right of Defendant in Injunction Suit to Have
Jury Determine Fact of Nuisance, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 605 (1939).
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sitting alone cannot adequately represent his community because of
the limitations of his own perceptions and values. The crucial
problem in environmental litigation has usually been the balanc-
ing of economic, social and environmental interests. 188 It is sub-
mitted that the jury, representing a cross section of these interests,
is the proper body to determine these questions which so critically
affect the community at large. Of course it is arguable that the
jury may be too sensitive to the economic impact of closing down
a factory or shutting down a quarry to rationally consider environ-
mental impact. It is likewise arguable, however, that a jury sitting
in an environmental action would be acutely aware of its over-
riding responsibility to the community and thus pursue its consid-
eration of the matter with more exhaustive reflection than would
a judge. In any event it is the entire community which must suf-
fer the effects of both environmental degradation and adverse
economic conditions. Accordingly, a jury representing a cross-
section of the community is a proper means of allowing public
participation in the decisionmaking process.
Even without implementation of the changes suggested by
this author, the powers of government attorneys exist in sufficient
quantity and quality to severely curtail the most flagrant activities
of those who continue to pollute our environment and dissipate
our resources. Whether these powers are utilized to the fullest
extent will, in the final analysis, be determined by what public
opinion demands of its legal representatives.
183. Hazelton, Public Policy for Controlling the Environment, 48 J. URBAN
LAW 631 (1971); Ogden, Economic Analysis of Air Pollution, 42 LAND-Eco-
NOMICS 137 (1966).
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